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Are State Marriage Amendments Bills of Attainder?: 
A Case Study of Utah’s Amendment Three 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Election Day, November 2, 2004, Utah, along with ten 
other states,1 amended its state constitution in response to what 
many view as a concerted effort to redefine marriage.2 Although the 
debate over marriage tends to evoke strong feelings on all sides, 
every marriage amendment on the November ballots passed; in some 
states the marriage amendments passed by overwhelming margins.3 
Opponents of these marriage amendments will likely challenge them 
as violating the Federal Constitution on the grounds of equal 
protection.4 Somewhat unexpectedly, the Federal Constitution’s Bill 
of Attainder Clause5 is emerging as alternate grounds for challenging 
 1. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Ohio, and Oregon all passed marriage amendments on Election Day 2004 in 
addition to Utah. CNN.com, Same-Sex Marriage Bans Winning on State Ballots (Nov. 3, 
2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/ballot.samesex.marriage/ 
index.html. Seventeen states have passed some form of marriage amendments, and at least two 
states have pending marriage amendments. See MarriageWatch.org, State Marriage 
Amendments, http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/Law/marriageamendments.cfm (last visited Apr. 
28, 2005); Marriage Law Foundation, Marriage Laws, http://marriagelawfoundation.org/ 
mlf/laws.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2005). 
 2. The judicial trail of this effort culminated in Massachusetts. Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (relying on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003)), to require recognition of same-sex marriage in the state of Massachusetts). For other 
information regarding the marriage debate and amendments, see Marriage Watch.org, Recent 
Developments, http://www.marriagewatch.org (last visited Apr. 27, 2005). 
 3. “More than 20 million Americans voted on the measures, which triumphed overall 
by a 2-to-1 ratio. In the four Southern states, the amendments received at least three-quarters 
of the votes, including 86 percent in Mississippi; the closest outcome besides Oregon [where 
the marriage amendment passed with 57 percent of the vote] was in Michigan, where the ban 
got 59 percent.” Associated Press, Voters Pass All 11 Bans on Gay Marriages (Nov. 3, 2004), 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353/index.html. 
 4. Prior challenges to acts relating to gay rights have been challenged on equal 
protection grounds. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding that a Colorado 
constitutional amendment prohibiting state agencies from treating sexual orientation as a 
protected status violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .”). 
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such amendments.6 While much recent legal commentary exists 
regarding the debate about same-sex marriage,7 few commentators 
have addressed the controversy using a bill of attainder analysis.8
The Bill of Attainder Clause is a relatively obscure constitutional 
provision, even among students of the Constitution.9 According to 
contemporary Supreme Court Attainder Clause jurisprudence, the 
clause protects both individuals and groups from legislative 
enactments that single out an affected person or class and impose 
punishments without allowing for judicial relief.10 The recent 
enactment of marriage amendments barring states from recognizing 
same-sex unions as marriages raises the question of whether states 
have singled out homosexuals for punishment without judicial relief 
in violation of the Attainder Clause. Although the ample 
commentary surrounding the broader, ongoing marriage debate 
does include some bill of attainder analysis in connection with gay 
rights,11 none of the existing commentary directly analyzes the 
question of whether state constitutional prohibitions of same-sex 
marriage constitute unlawful bills of attainder under the Federal 
Constitution. 
 6. The Nebraska Marriage Amendment is currently being challenged as a bill of 
attainder under the Federal Constitution. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc., v. Bruning, 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 1004, 1008–11 (D. Neb. 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs had stated a claim that 
the state amendment was an unlawful bill of attainder, thus defeating the defense’s motion to 
dismiss and moving the case toward a trial on the merits). 
 7. See, e.g., Same-Sex Marriage Symposium Issue, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 273 (2004) 
(discussing the issue from the viewpoints of both proponents and opponents of same-sex 
marriage); Helen M. Alvaré, Saying “Yes” Before Saying “I Do”: Premarital Sex and 
Cohabitation as a Piece of the Divorce Puzzle, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7 
(2004) (discussing the issue from the viewpoints of both proponents and opponents of same-
sex marriage); see also Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 129 (2003) (discussing the movement to end state-sponsored marriage in the United 
States). 
 8. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder, and the Definition of 
Punishment: On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 227 (1998) (discussing marriage legislation in light of the federal 
Constitution’s prohibition of bills of attainder); Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 
2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 208 (1996) (suggesting that the Attainder Clause 
“offers lawyers litigating gay rights cases a particularly rich and apt source of doctrine”). 
 9. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 
1787, at 90–144 (1956). 
 10. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) 
(describing the Court’s current doctrinal approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause). 
 11. Amar, supra note 8; Stasser, supra note 8. 
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This Comment fills this gap in the Attainder Clause literature by 
analyzing Utah’s Marriage Amendment on bill of attainder grounds, 
thereby providing a framework for analyzing similar enactments. The 
Attainder Clause analysis below reveals that Utah’s Marriage 
Amendment (“Amendment Three”) is not a bill of attainder because 
it does not single out a group or individual for punishment within 
the meaning of the Attainder Clause. Furthermore, because 
Amendment Three operates in a generally applicable, regulatory 
fashion, it falls well within the scope of proper legislative power. 
Therefore, invalidating a marriage amendment that operates in the 
same or similar fashion as Amendment Three under the Bill of 
Attainder Clause would seriously threaten the legislative and political 
process by allowing any group or individual who dislikes a particular 
political outcome to challenge it successfully as a bill of attainder. 
Part II provides a brief review of the case law under the Bill of 
Attainder Clause and outlines the current Supreme Court doctrine 
under the clause. Part III analyzes Amendment Three according to 
current Attainder Clause doctrine and concludes that the 
amendment does not constitute an unlawful bill of attainder. This 
Part also addresses additional doctrinal implications associated with 
this conclusion, namely, that in order to find that the amendment is 
a bill of attainder a court will have to adopt a constitutional test that 
has virtually no rational limitation. Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE ATTAINDER CLAUSE: DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT 
DOCTRINE 
A. The Historical Approach to Attainder Analysis 
 
Historically, a bill of attainder was a very specific device used in 
the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, whereby 
Parliament sentenced a person or a group of persons to death for 
attempting or threatening to attempt an overthrow of the 
government.12 Bills of pains and penalties functioned essentially the 
same as bills of attainder; however, the punishment inflicted on the 
offender was something short of death. Typical punishments under 
 12. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 (1965) (“In addition to the death 
sentence, attainder generally carried with it a ‘corruption of blood,’ which meant that the 
attainted party’s heirs could not inherit his property.”). For a more complete historical review 
of bills of attainder, see CHAFEE, supra note 9, at 90–144. 
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bills of pains and penalties included banishment, disenfranchisement, 
and exclusion of the offender’s sons from serving in the Parliament.13
A historical approach to the Attainder Clause construes the 
clause as a narrow, specific, and formulaic proscription that is 
unlikely to have an enduring impact on modern legislation.14 Under 
the historical approach, an act does not violate the Attainder Clause 
unless it contains all the features of a historical bill of attainder. 
Accordingly, the act must (1) specify by name or adequate 
description the person or class being attainted; (2) specify the offense 
for which the punishment is imposed; (3) declare the guilt of the 
attainted party; and (4) impose punishment in a traditional historical 
form (death, banishment, imprisonment) without a judicial trial.15
In effect, historic bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties 
constituted a “trial by legislature”16 because the legislature or 
Parliament assumed full judicial and legislative power in enacting and 
adjudicating the bills; the legislature made the rule, adjudged and 
declared the guilt of the party or group, and then measured and 
affixed the punishment.17 The offender was not entitled to judicial 
relief of any sort.  
 13. Brown, 381 U.S. at 441–42. 
 14. This historical view was first asserted by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring 
opinion in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318–30 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); see also Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified 
Guarantee of Process, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 96–97 (1983) (stating that the historical approach 
to the Attainder Clause “has a narrow and explicit historical meaning and can be recognized by 
several immutable characteristics: a specified offense for a specified individual, a declaration of 
the guilt of that individual, ex post facto application, and a clear decree of punishment”); Note, 
Beyond Process: A Substantive Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REV. 475, 
497 (1984) [hereinafter Beyond Process] (“The use of . . . [a] historical definition[] as a 
touchstone creates a proscription that is easy for courts to enforce but equally easy for 
Congress to avoid,” and if such an interpretation “is somehow ‘correct,’ the results that would 
flow from it would serve no real purpose.”). 
 15. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
When the framers of the Constitution proscribed bills of attainder, they referred to a 
form of law which had been prevalent in monarchial England and was employed in 
the colonies. They were familiar with its nature; they had experienced its use; they 
knew what they wanted to prevent. It was not a law unfair in general, even unfair 
because affecting merely particular individuals, that they outlawed by the explicitness 
of their prohibition of bills of attainder. “Upon this point a page of history is worth 
a volume of logic.” 
Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
 16. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442. 
 17. Id. at 441–46. 
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During the Federal Convention of 1787, the prohibitions against 
bills of attainder were unanimously approved without debate.18 Thus, 
the Federal Constitution prohibits the federal government as well as 
state governments from enacting any bills of attainder.19
One reason bills of attainder are so offensive is because a single 
branch of government uses both judicial and legislative power when 
enacting them. By prohibiting the use of such bills, the Framers gave 
practical expression to the principle that government powers must be 
separated among the independent branches in order to strike a 
balance of powers and prevent abuses. The legislature was to enact 
generally applicable rules that courts were to apply to specific 
individuals and situations.20 One reason for this limitation on 
legislative power is the assumption that the “Legislative Branch is 
not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the 
task of ruling upon the blameworthiness, of, and levying appropriate 
punishment upon, specific persons.”21
These general propositions regarding the division of power 
suggest that an expansive view of the Attainder Clause would ensure 
against the possibility of legislative abuses. However, the principle of 
separation of powers is one of balance. If the judiciary invalidates an 
enactment on the basis that it is something akin to a historic bill of 
attainder, the balance of power may be jeopardized by unduly 
restricting the legislative role of establishing generally applicable rules 
and preventing Congress from fulfilling its proper and intended 
 18. Id. at 441. For the actual Convention discussions surrounding the prohibition of 
attainders, see JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
Debates of August 22, reprinted in LYNN D. WARDLE, READINGS ON ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ch. 16, at 61 (2001). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.”); id. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .”). 
 20. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 446 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 
(1810)) (“It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the 
government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be 
the duty of other departments.”). 
 21. Id. at 445.  
Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and 
organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its members upon 
the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to 
popular clamor, is not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, 
and impartiality a [case or matter], especially in those cases in which the 
popular feeling is strongly excited,—the very class of cases most likely to be 
prosecuted by this mode. 
Id. (quoting 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 536–37 (8th ed. 1927)). 
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function.22 Indeed, while the Attainder Clause operates to support 
the separation of powers doctrine, the clause is not “the chief means 
of implementing” that doctrine.23 Therefore, any approach to the 
Attainder Clause must be carefully tailored to prevent legislative 
abuses without crippling genuine legislative activities, particularly 
when the issues involved are highly charged political controversies.24 
The legislative and amendment processes are designed to enable the 
representative body or the electorate to resolve politically charged 
issues by establishing general policies.25 A proper construction of the 
Bill of Attainder Clause ought, therefore, to leave these general 
rulemaking processes in tact. In order to do so a court must 
remember that Bills of Attainder have typically arisen after a political 
controversy has been resolved and the majority in power seeks to slip 
in a left jab after the round is over in order to punish a political 
opponent. 
The Supreme Court’s efforts to tailor such an approach have 
been somewhat haphazard. The only relevant pronouncement by the 
Court prior to the Civil War was that the Constitution’s prohibition 
 22. Id. at 475 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s [expansive interpretation] cuts 
too broadly and invalidates legitimate legislative activity.”). In his dissent, Justice White argues 
that even “conflict-of-interest” statutes and imposition of qualifications for certain avocations 
for the benefit of society may be invalidated by the Brown majority’s overly expansive 
conception of the Attainder Clause. Id. at 465–72 (White, J., dissenting). These comments 
emphasize the need for an Attainder Clause approach that provides meaningful protection in 
modern society and has rational limitations that enable the legislature to operate within its 
sphere of general rule making. 
 23. Id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting). 
 24. See Kevin J. Worthen, Who Decides and What Difference Does It Make?: Defining 
Marriage in “Our Democratic, Federal Republic,” 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 273, 292 (2004). 
Worthen argues that “[n]on-textual value judgments made by governmental actors who are 
not elected representatives of the sovereign people run the risk of creating one kind of tyranny 
‘our’ system was designed to prevent—extraneous creation and imposition of values.” When 
moral issues are being decided on a societal level, deference to the people’s judgment is 
particularly important.  
[I]n our system, the ultimate sovereign who must remain responsible for 
whatever acts the government takes is the people. While there are filters 
[through] which the people’s judgment must pass before it is properly 
implemented in our system, in the long run, it is [the people’s] judgment, not 
that of the judiciary, which should control. 
Id. at 306. 
 25. Id. 
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of bills of attainder applied equally to bills of pains and penalties.26 It 
was not until 1866 that the Court ventured upon its first direct 
analysis of the Attainder Clause,27 when in a single term the Court 
decided two similar Attainder Clause cases.28 From this point 
forward, the Court’s case law and the academic commentary 
concerning the Attainder Clause describe what is known as the 
functional approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause. 
The functional approach stands in contrast to a purely historical 
approach to the clause, which would confine the Attainder Clause’s 
operation entirely to its historical roots.29 Whereas a historical 
approach essentially renders the Attainder Clause meaningless 
because legislatures may easily avoid the formulaic proscription with 
mere technicalities,30 the functional approach provides meaningful 
protection that may not be easily circumvented by legislative 
maneuvering. On the other end of the doctrinal spectrum is an 
approach to the clause that can be termed an ultra-functional 
approach. This approach views the Attainder Clause as an illimitable 
protection by advocating for broad doctrinal conceptions that would 
make legislating in many areas virtually impossible.31 Presently, the 
United States Supreme Court has not adopted either the historical or 
ultra-functional approaches; rather, it has opted for the 
constitutionally moderate functional approach. 
 26. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (“A bill of attainder may affect 
the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.”). By implication, then, 
bills of pains and penalties were bills of attainder under the Constitution and therefore prohibited. 
 27. Throughout this Comment, both attainder clauses are referred to in the singular 
form, as the analysis of one would apply equally to the other. 
 28. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 333 (1867). Cummings invalidated a state constitutional provision that required 
members of several vocations to take an oath affirming past, present, and future allegiance to 
the Union. Members of the Confederacy were unable to take the oath due to past sympathies 
or activities in opposition to the Union during the Civil War. In Ex parte Garland, the Court 
invalidated, as a bill of attainder, a piece of federal legislation that required attorneys wishing to 
practice law before the federal bench to take a loyalty oath similar to the oath considered in 
Cummings. 
 29. See supra note 14. 
 30. Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 497 (“The use of . . . [a] historical definition[] as a 
touchstone creates a proscription that is easy for courts to enforce but equally easy for 
Congress to avoid . . . [, and if such an] interpretation[] is somehow ‘correct,’ the results that 
would flow from it would serve no real purpose.”). 
 31. This view of the clause was advocated but rejected in United States v. Brown, 381 
U.S. 437, 461 (1965); see also Amar, supra note 8, at 203 (outlining a broad conception of the 
Attainder Clause); Strasser, supra note 8, at 227 (arguing for a similar approach to the clause). 
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B. The Development of the Functional Approach 
The functional approach provides a meaningful and useful 
middle-ground interpretation of the Attainder Clause.32 This 
approach, while developed haphazardly in the Court’s case law,33 
effectively addresses the legitimate Due Process and Separation of 
Powers concerns associated with legislatively imposed punishment on 
ascertainable groups or individuals without unnecessarily and 
inappropriately restricting the legislative and political processes. The 
Supreme Court’s current version of the functional approach, 
established in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,34 has two 
key elements of analysis—specificity and punishment. The Nixon 
standard developed through a long series of cases that, taken 
together, provide the analytical framework for modern attainder 
cases. 
1. The Cummings and Garland beginnings 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of loyalty oaths designed to prevent confederate 
sympathizers from enjoying the privileges they had enjoyed prior to 
the war. In Cummings v. Missouri35 and Ex parte Garland,36 the 
Court refused to be bound by the historical confines of the Attainder 
Clause and held that the oaths in question constituted unlawful bills 
of attainder. These cases established the early contours of the 
functional approach by requiring consideration of three factors in an 
Attainder Clause analysis: (1) specificity—whether the act in question 
operates against an easily ascertainable group or individual; (2) 
punishment—whether the act inflicts punishment upon the offenders 
 32. See Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 493, which argues that a functional approach 
serves the meaningful purposes of preventing “legislatively imposed punishment of identifiable 
groups or individuals” and providing “absolute protection against retroactive punishment of 
political activity, regardless of . . . the state’s interest in regulation. This protection avoids the 
chill caused by the unknowable risk of subsequent legislative penalty, without affecting the 
state’s right to act prospectively when its interests outweigh any burden” placed on an 
ascertainable class by the prospective, generally applicable rules the legislature enacts. Id. 
 33. For a review of the development of the clause’s functional interpretation, see id. at 
476–92; Timothy J. Hennessy, Note, New York Legislature Attaints Con Ed: New Significance 
for the Protection from Bills of Attainder, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 641, 645–47 (2003); and 
Welsh, supra note 14, at 90–102. 
 34. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 35. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). 
 36. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). 
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for past acts by depriving them of previously enjoyed civil or political 
rights; and (3) regulation—whether the state’s power to regulate the 
ordinary avocations of life is being used to inflict punishment or to 
establish general rules for the regulation of societal institutions.37  
In addressing the specificity of the acts in question, the Court 
held that where an act creates a target class based on past, irreversible 
conduct, the act satisfies the test and resembles a bill of attainder.38 
Also, the Court rejected the idea that punishment under the 
Attainder Clause was confined to only its historical meaning (i.e., 
death, banishment, imprisonment etc.), and held that “[t]he 
deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may 
be punishment.”39 With regards to Cummings and Garland, the 
Court held that the oaths inflicted punishment because their effect 
was to perpetually exclude the target classes from engaging in 
professions they had previously enjoyed as a consequence of their 
past involvement with the Confederacy.40 Finally, the Court 
evaluated whether the loyalty oaths were a valid expression of the 
state’s power to regulate societal institutions. Here the Court laid 
down the rule that the Attainder Clause is offended whenever the 
police “power [is] made . . . [into] an instrument for the infliction of 
punishment” by setting a qualification that “reach[es] the person, 
not the calling.”41 This final distinction serves as a helpful analytical 
tool in determining whether an act is punitive or regulatory in 
nature. 
Although these early pronouncements by the Court are clarified 
and refined in subsequent Court decisions, the three general 
inquiries of specificity, punishment, and regulation remain integral to 
current functional approach Attainder Clause analysis. 
 37. See id. at 374–99; Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 316–32. 
 38. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323–25 (holding that the act was sufficiently 
specific because it operated against the class of individuals that sympathized with the 
Confederacy during the Civil War); Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377 (“The statute is 
directed against parties who have offended in any of the particulars embraced by these 
clauses.”). 
 39. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.), at 320; see also Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377 
(“[E]xclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past 
conduct can be regarded in no other light than as punishment for such conduct.”). 
 40. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320; Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.), at 394–99. 
 41. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.), at 319–20; see also Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 
379–80 (“The legislature may undoubtedly . . . prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any 
of the ordinary avocations of life[, but where this power is] exercised as a means for the 
infliction of punishment [the act violates the Attainder Clause].”). 
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2. The contribution of Dent and Hawker 
In Dent v. West Virginia42 and Hawker v. New York,43 the 
Supreme Court began to see that the principles established in 
Cummings and Garland, without further refining, were “not 
amenable to rational limitation.”44 Therefore, the Court carved out 
an important limitation to the Attainder Clause doctrine: legislatures 
may establish qualifications that tend to preserve and strengthen 
important societal institutions. 
Dent and Hawker dealt with, respectively, the state’s ability (1) 
to establish new educational requirements for medical doctors45 and 
(2) to prevent convicted felons from practicing medicine.46 The 
statutes in Dent and Hawker functioned in essentially the same 
fashion as the acts invalidated in Cummings and Garland47 in that 
each act prevented a specific group from engaging in ordinary 
avocations of life on account of past conduct. The group in Dent was 
barred from the profession for failing (in the past) to meet the 
educational requirements and the group in Hawker was barred from 
the profession for committing (in the past) a felony. 
The Court in Dent and Hawker was thus confronted with the 
prospect of invalidating meaningful regulation of societal institutions 
based on previous Attainder Clause decisions or further developing 
Attainder Clause doctrine and finding the statutes constitutional. 
The Court elected to follow the later course by holding that the acts 
in Dent and Hawker were sufficiently related to the excluded group’s 
fitness for the avocation and therefore did not constitute 
punishment.48 Thus, the Court found that the state’s power was not 
being used to inflict punishment; rather, the power was being used 
to preserve confidence in the institution or practice of medicine, an 
 42. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
 43. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
 44. Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 482. The author explains that “the Court’s 
functional analysis, though not formalistic [like the rejected historic approach], was not 
amenable to rational limitation. Consequently, when Hawker and Dent arose, the Court had to 
choose between striking down” valid regulatory acts or limiting the breadth of the functional 
approach.  
 45. Dent, 129 U.S. at 121–25. 
 46. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 189–91. 
 47. See Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 482. 
 48. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 198–99 (citing Dent, 129 U.S. at 128). 
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institution of “high importance” to society.49 In so holding, the 
Court established an important exception to the line of reasoning in 
Cummings and Garland, which proves crucial in appropriately 
limiting current Attainder Clause doctrine. 
The Court’s further development of its Attainder Clause doctrine 
in Dent and Hawker created a meaningful, “rational limitation”50 on 
the functional approach. This limitation gives effect to the separation 
of powers rationale for the Attainder Clause.51 According to the 
reasoning underlying the Court’s decisions in Dent and Hawker, the 
legislature may establish meaningful qualifications in the form of 
generally applicable rules for those societal institutions that are of 
high importance to society, while the judiciary retains control over 
those instances when a qualification is arbitrarily directed at the 
person instead of “the calling” in order to inflict punishment.52  
C. Current Attainder Clause Doctrine 
The precedents described above, combined with several Court 
decisions53 in the intervening years, presently constitute the Court’s 
 49. Id. at 195 (quoting Eastman v. State, 10 N.E. 97, 98 (Ind. 1887)) (“[I]t is, no one 
can doubt, of high importance to the community that health, limb, and life should not be left 
to the treatment of ignorant pretenders and charlatans.”). Apparently, because the medical 
profession affected society so profoundly and was of such high importance, the Court was 
more deferential to the state’s power to establish meaningful qualifications in order to preserve 
trust, confidence, and esteem for the medical profession. Id. at 192–95. Thus, the greater the 
importance of the regulated profession or institution, the greater the deference to the state as 
to “[t]he nature and extent of the qualifications.” Id. at 195 (quoting Dent, 129 U.S. at 122). 
 50. Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 482. 
 51. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 52. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867). 
 53. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (invalidating an act cutting off 
compensation to three named government employees that the legislature deemed to be 
disloyal because of their affiliation with the Communist Party), the Court reaffirmed the rules 
set forth in Cummings and Garland but failed to recognize the contribution of Dent and 
Hawker. This failure, and the Court’s decisions in American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 
339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding an act that conditioned official recognition of labor unions 
on the filing of affidavits affirming that the union officers were not members of the Communist 
Party and did not believe in the overthrow of the government), and United States v. Brown, 
381 U.S. 437 (1965) (striking down a statute that made it a crime for members of the 
Communist Party to serve as officers of labor unions), put the Attainder Clause doctrine on 
uncertain grounds because its contours were left unclear. The lack of clarity and certainty arose 
because each case rested on different footing, leaving in doubt what degree of latitude the 
legislature possessed in regulating societal institutions. For more information regarding this 
period of uncertainty, see Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 483–88; Welsh, supra note 14, at 
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controlling Attainder Clause doctrine. The Court’s current analytical 
framework for attainder cases successfully addresses the bill of 
attainder question by requiring consideration of the key elements of 
specificity and punishment, while incorporating into the analysis of 
what constitutes punishment the question of whether an act is 
regulatory in nature. By incorporating the question of regulation 
into the punishment analysis, the attainder clause doctrine takes into 
account the important Dent and Hawker exception. Furthermore, 
current doctrine ensures that the Attainder Clause remains a viable 
and meaningful constitutional protection without introducing into 
the constitutional framework a doctrine does not have rational 
limitations. 
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,54 the Court 
consolidated prior Attainder Clause precedent into a comprehensive 
analytical framework. The Nixon framework requires a two-step 
analysis. First, a court must evaluate the specificity of the act in 
question. When an act is too specifically targeted at a group or 
individual it may violate the Attainder Clause. Specificity, however, 
does not automatically implicate a bill of attainder concern.55 If a 
person can avoid the burden inflicted by a particular enactment, the 
act fails the specificity requirement. Second, a court must decide 
whether the burdens imposed by an act constitute punishment 
within the meaning of the Attainder Clause. A burden constitutes 
punishment if (1) the act imposes punishment in any of the historical 
forms, including death, imprisonment, banishment, corruption of 
blood, and perpetual exclusion from professions; (2) the act furthers 
no legitimate nonpunitive legislative purpose; or (3) the 
congressional record evinces an unmistakable intent to punish the 
targeted individual or group.56
The Nixon framework was applied and expanded somewhat in 
Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group.57 
In this case, the Court sought to determine whether a law cutting off 
financial aid to students who failed to register for the selective service 
93–99 (“The effort on the part of the Brown Court to clarify the bill of attainder doctrine was 
not, however, entirely successful.”); and Hennessy, supra note 33, at 647–51. 
 54. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 55. Id. at 472 (“[E]ven if the specificity element . . . [is satisfied], the Bill of Attainder 
Clause would not automatically be implicated.”). 
 56. See id. at 473–84. 
 57. 468 U.S. 841 (1984). 
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violated the Attainder Clause.58 The Court declined to find that the 
Nixon specificity requirement was satisfied because the barrier 
established by Congress was not an “absolute barrier” to receiving 
financial aid on account of past conduct.59 The Court held that the 
act did not contain the requisite specificity because the affected class 
of nonregistrants could penetrate the barrier and obtain the desired 
benefits by satisfying the requirements established by Congress.60 
Thus, the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group decision 
provided specificity with a new life in the form of a rational 
limitation.61 If the targeted class is not defined by past, irreversible 
conduct, the specificity requirement is not satisfied. Had the act 
specified that anyone who had failed to register by a specific date was 
forever barred from receiving financial aid regardless of future 
conduct, the specificity requirement as articulated by the Court 
would have been satisfied. 
The Court next applied each of the Nixon tests for punishment. 
First, the Court held that the burden imposed by the act did not 
constitute punishment in the form of a “legislative bar to 
participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or 
professions”62 because the bar was not absolute—the nonregistrants 
“carr[ied] the keys of their prison in their own pockets.”63 In simpler 
terms, the Court held that the nonregistrants had not been punished 
because they could avoid the adverse consequences provided for in 
the act by simply complying with the requirements. The Court 
found that the legislation furthered the nonpunitive goal of 
“improving compliance with the registration requirement”64 and the 
 58. Id. at 844. 
 59. Id. at 850. 
 60. Id. at 850–51 (“Cummings and Garland, dealt with absolute barriers to entry into 
certain professions for those who could not file the required loyalty oaths; no one who had 
served the Confederacy could possibly comply, for his status was irreversible.”). 
 61. In Nixon, the Court had held that the specificity requirement was not satisfied 
because former president Richard Nixon constituted a “legitimate class of one.” Nixon v. 
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977). This holding virtually eliminated the 
significance of the specificity requirement. The Minnesota Public Interest case, however, 
reasserted the possibility that an act may actually be considered too specific if it creates a class 
based on past, irreversible conduct. 
 62. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 852. 
 63. Id. The Court held that “[a] statute that leaves open perpetually the possibility of 
qualifying for [the desired benefit] does not fall within the historical meaning of forbidden 
legislative punishment.” Id. 
 64. Id. at 854. 
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legislative history of the act did not demonstrate an unmistakable 
punitive motive.65
The bill of attainder analysis as articulated by the Court in 
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group is the clearest example of 
the current Attainder Clause Doctrine. Given that it is the Court’s 
clearest and most recent Attainder Clause precedent, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that an examining court would address a bill 
of attainder question in a similar manner.  
III. AMENDMENT THREE, A BILL OF ATTAINDER? 
In the coming years, courts will likely be called upon to apply the 
current Attainder Clause doctrine to the recent flurry of marriage 
amendments.66 In order to assist courts in their examinations, this 
Part analyzes whether Utah’s Amendment Three constitutes an 
unlawful bill of attainder under the Federal Constitution. The 
following analysis shows that Amendment Three is not a bill of 
attainder because it does not single out a specific class for 
punishment. Rather, the amendment operates in a generally 
applicable, regulatory manner and resolves a heated political debate. 
Likewise, other amendments that track Amendment Three’s 
generality and serve a similar regulatory function are not bills of 
attainder.  
A. The Amendment 
Effective January 1, 2005, Amendment Three to the Utah 
Constitution reads as follows: “(1) Marriage consists only of the legal 
union between a man and a woman; (2) No other domestic union, 
however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the 
same or substantially equivalent legal effect.”67 The amendment’s 
two parts play distinct roles. 
 65. Id. at 855–56 (“Congress sought not to punish anyone, but to promote compliance 
with the draft registration requirement and fairness in the allocation of scarce federal 
resources.”). 
 66. In Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (2003), 
the Federal District Court for the District of Nebraska was called upon to apply the Attainder 
Clause doctrine to Nebraska’s marriage amendment. The court found that the amendment 
constituted a bill of attainder. Consequently, other courts will likely hear Attainder Clause 
challenges of other amendments. 
 67. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
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The first part defines marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman. This part of the amendment incited relatively little 
controversy during the debate leading up to its passage.68 The actual 
effect of this constitutional definition of marriage is hard to assess 
because the laws in Utah, and in the United States generally, have 
not abandoned this basic definition of marriage.69
The second part of the amendment singles out marriage between 
a man and a woman for favored treatment over other domestic 
unions—homosexual, polygamous, or otherwise. It achieves this 
result by prohibiting the state from recognizing alternative domestic 
arrangements “as a marriage” or giving such relationships the “same 
or substantially equivalent” legal effect.70
The state may still afford some benefits to individuals engaged in 
nontraditional sexual relationships; however, these benefits, taken 
together, cannot constitute official recognition. Nor can this package 
of benefits be the same or substantially equivalent to the benefits 
conferred on monogamous, heterosexual marriages. When the state 
makes benefits available to nontraditional unions, the courts are left 
to determine two questions: first, whether the particular package of 
benefits constitutes official recognition by the state within the 
meaning of the amendment; and second, whether the package is the 
same or substantially equivalent set of benefits conferred upon the 
traditional marriage institution.71
 68. See, e.g., Deborah Bulkeley, Nuptial Amendment Supported Strongly, DESERET 
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2004, at A01 (indicating widespread agreement in the electorate 
over the first sentence of the amendment and somewhat less agreement over the second 
sentence). 
 69. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (providing the same 
definition of marriage); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4 (2000) (same). 
 70. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 71. While it is indeed speculative to say just exactly how the amendment will operate, 
these views of the amendment are consistent with preelection analysis. See UTAH VOTER 
INFORMATION PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 2, 2004, at 35 (“The 
Amendment prohibits a domestic union from being given [the] same or similar rights, benefits, 
and obligations [given to traditional marriages]. The scope of that prohibition may be more 
precisely defined by Utah courts as they interpret the provision in the context of lawsuits that 
may arise.”); see also, Yes! For Marriage, The True Legal Effect of Amendment Three: Why the 
Critics Are Wrong, at 7 (on file with author) (expressing the view that the amendment would 
not prevent the legislature from extending some benefits to nontraditional unions). 
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B. Doctrinal Analysis of the Amendment 
Evaluating Amendment Three using current Attainder Clause 
doctrine requires a determination of whether: (1) it is sufficiently 
specific to invoke an Attainder Clause analysis, and (2) whether it 
imposes punishment. As will be seen, Utah’s Amendment Three 
survives Attainder Clause analysis under the functional approach 
because it lacks the specificity required and it does not inflict 
punishment in any of the historically accepted forms, it furthers a 
legitimate nonpunitive purpose, and the legislative history of the 
amendment does not evince an intent to punish. 
1. Amendment Three lacks the specificity required to be a bill of 
attainder  
Amendment Three lacks the specificity that attainder analysis 
typically requires in finding a certain act to constitute a bill of 
attainder. The language and effect of Amendment Three do not 
single out a specific group of nontraditional unions. According to 
the United States Supreme Court, an enactment is sufficiently 
specific if it applies to a named or easily ascertainable individual or 
class.72 The mere specificity of a law, however, does not “call into 
play the Bill of Attainder Clause;”73 rather, the affected class must be 
defined by past conduct that makes their ineligibility for a particular 
benefit “irreversible.”74 If the members of the affected class can 
obtain the desired benefits through future conduct the specificity 
requirement is not met.75
 72. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 
(1984); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 73. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 n.33 (1977). 
 74. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 851. 
 75. Id. at 850–51. The Court commented: 
Cummings and Garland dealt with absolute barriers to entry into certain professions 
for those who could not file the required loyalty oaths; no one who had served the 
Confederacy could possibly comply, for his status was irreversible. By contrast [the 
requirements of the act limiting Title IV education loan benefits to those who 
register for the draft is] far from irreversible. . . . “Far from attaching to . . . past and 
ineradicable actions,” ineligibility for Title IV benefits “is made to turn upon 
continuingly contemporaneous fact” which a student who wants public assistance 
can correct. 
Id. (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 87 (1961)); 
see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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The language of Amendment Three does not name or reference 
any specific individual or class. It does, however, use the words “no 
other domestic union.”76 While this phrase is similar to others that 
have become associated with the same-sex marriage movement, it 
encompasses far more than same-sex relationships.77 Most notably in 
Utah, polygamous unions fall within this definition.78 Unlike other 
marriage amendments, Amendment Three’s language does not 
specifically target same-sex couples by overtly referencing titles79 and 
phrases that connote a particular group.80 At most, the amendment 
designates by implication and not overt reference a class of all 
nontraditional domestic arrangements, one of which is same-sex 
couples. 
To find the specificity required by the Attainder Clause, one may 
also determine whether there is a sufficient description of the 
 76. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 77. Other arrangements logically brought within the amendment’s reference to “any 
other domestic union” include incestuous marriage, marriage with minors or animals, or 
marriage to multiple partners of the same sex. See George W. Dent Jr., Traditional Marriage 
Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419 (2004) (listing other nontraditional unions that 
would fall within the language used in the amendment). While Utah does not presently allow 
these nontraditional alternatives to be recognized as marriages, the recognition of same-sex 
unions as marriages logically opens the door for other non-traditional unions to gain similar 
recognition. Therefore, the amendment’s language was drafted to encompass more than just 
same-sex unions. Id. 
 78. The arguments proffered for recognizing same-sex unions as marriages are the same 
arguments that support all other kinds of marriages, unions, and arrangements. This reality is 
particularly true in the case of polygamy in Utah. For more on this subject see Dent, supra 
note 77, at 419 (arguing that the arguments for the recognition of same-sex marriage are the 
same for polygamy, incestuous marriages, and other nontraditional arrangements), and Cassiah 
M. Ward, I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives: Lawrence v. Texas and the Practice of 
Polygamy in Modern America, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 131 (2004) (analyzing the 
legality of polygamy in light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003)). Furthermore, the debates surrounding the passage of the joint resolution to 
submit the amendment to the Utah electorate for approval reveals that effect of the act on 
polygamous unions was a concern of at least one of the representatives who spoke on the 
house floor. H.J.R. 25, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess. (Utah 2004) (containing Representative 
Hansen’s questions to the bill’s sponsor, which suggest the need to include in the amendment 
wording that would cover polygamous unions). 
 79. Cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 455 (1965) (holding that the overt 
reference to the Communist Party was not a semantically equivalent phrase by which Congress 
could designate a list of undesirable characteristics which it would have been entitled to 
regulated). 
 80. Other marriage amendments, such as Nebraska’s amendment, specifically name 
“civil unions” and “domestic partners” as the target of the amendment, which led a district 
court to find that the specificity requirement was satisfied. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. 
Bruning, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (D. Neb. 2003).  
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targeted class and whether that class is populated based on past 
irreversible conduct. If there is a class of individuals singled out 
because of past, irreversible conduct, the specificity requirement is 
satisfied.81 Here the examination becomes somewhat more difficult. 
The recent set of state marriage amendments, including Amendment 
Three, were passed in response to recent court decisions82 which 
many view as threatening traditional societal norms, and most of the 
attention was focused on same-sex marriages, not other 
nontraditional arrangements. For instance, the majority of the debate 
surrounding Amendment Three centered on the propriety of 
recognizing or banning same-sex marriages.83 Nonetheless, the 
specificity required under an Attainder Clause analysis does not exist 
unless the act makes a specific designation or description of the 
targeted class based on past irreversible conduct, which makes it 
impossible for the affected class to obtain the benefits in question.84
Selective Services System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research 
Group85 again provides a helpful example of how this rule operates. 
In considering the case of nonregistrants for the draft, the Supreme 
Court held that because the barrier established by the act was not 
absolute, the specificity requirement was not met regardless of the 
fact that Congress targeted a specific class for past behavior.86 While 
sexual orientation and draft registration are very different topics by 
nature, the principle of singling out a class of persons described by 
past, irreversible conduct so that the class can never obtain the 
benefits in question is central to the very meaning of a bill of 
attainder.87 The Minnesota Public Interest case stands for the 
proposition that an act does not satisfy the specificity requirement 
unless an absolute barrier is erected as a consequence of past conduct 
 81. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a ban on consensual, 
adult homosexual sodomy); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003) (legalizing same-sex marriage in Massachusetts). 
 83. The newspaper columns leading up to Election Day illustrate that the debate really 
centered on same-sex marriages and not other nontraditional unions. See, e.g., Deborah 
Bulkeley, Group Flays Gay Nuptial Proposal, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 2, 2004, at B4 
(discussing the entire debate surrounding the amendment in terms of gay marriage); Rebecca 
Walsh, Huntsman Proposes New Partner Rights, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 25, 2004, at B1. 
 84. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 848–51. 
 87. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318 (1867). 
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that is irreversible.88 Amendment Three does not create an absolute 
barrier and no past conduct disqualifies anyone from the benefits 
associated with traditional marriages. 
Contrary to traditional and contemporary bills of attainder, 
Amendment Three neither describes nor references any past 
conduct. The absence of any tie between past conduct and future 
ineligibility makes the amendment even less specific than the act in 
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, which specifically tied the 
ineligibility to past behavior. Furthermore, Amendment Three 
provides for the affected individuals ample opportunity to obtain the 
benefits in question. A member of the affected class may obtain the 
benefits of marriage by choosing to marry one adult person of the 
opposite sex, by petitioning the legislature to make available another 
set of benefits allowed under the amendment, or by foregoing the 
benefits entirely by entering into a nontraditional arrangement and 
receiving whatever benefits are available to such unions. 
It has been argued that homosexuality is either an irreversible 
condition or extremely difficult to change, and that therefore the 
specificity requirement is satisfied because a person cannot easily 
obtain the benefits in question.89 This argument, however, 
misconstrues the specificity requirement by focusing on the 
irreversibility of homosexual tendencies and behaviors. The true 
Attainder Clause inquiry is whether the barrier established between 
the affected class and the benefits is absolute, not whether the 
behavior underlying the controversy is irreversible.90 When one 
considers the practical effect of the amendment, it may well be said 
that the barrier is burdensome because it may require a homosexual 
to choose between changing sexual preferences and receiving 
marriage benefits, yet the barrier is not absolute, so the specificity 
requirement is not met. 91
 88. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 848. 
 89. See Strasser, supra note 8, at 251; Amar, supra note 8, at 218. 
 90. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 850. 
 91. The alternatives described may not be the ideal set of options one would desire, but 
the Attainder Clause does not provide a vehicle for invalidating any act that a particular group 
or individual dislikes. It is highly likely that many of the nonregistrants for the draft felt 
disgruntled by effect of the act and were forced to either forego financial aid or comply and 
receive the aid benefits. With every piece of controversial legislation there will be those who 
dislike its effects. This does not mean the group has been singled our or punished within the 
meaning of the Attainder Clause. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 470 (1977). 
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A broad reading of Amendment Three’s language may suggest 
that it describes and specifies a class of nontraditional domestic 
unions, yet this mere specification, without more, does not meet the 
requirements of the Bill of Attainder Clause. In sum, the 
Amendment does not satisfy the specificity requirement because the 
plain language of the amendment does not specify an individual or 
class, and the class created by the broad descriptive language of the 
amendment is not absolutely barred from obtaining benefits 
associated with marriage. Moreover, the amendment establishes the 
framework in which the benefits sought may be obtained by 
individuals and provides guidance for how the state may 
prospectively afford benefits to other domestic unions. Other 
marriage amendments, however, likely do satisfy the specificity 
requirement by specifically naming the targeted class by using 
phrases like “Civil Union” or “Domestic Partnerships.”92 However, 
upon review of the case law in this area, specificity, or lack thereof, 
would not likely prove fatal to a particular act depending on whether 
the act is viewed as inflicting punishment or as merely performing a 
regulatory function. 
2. Amendment Three does not result in legislative punishment 
In establishing the framework for the dispensing of particular 
benefits associated with marriage, Amendment Three does not inflict 
punishment on any individual or class because it is generally 
applicable, it increases support for traditional marriage and the 
attendant societal benefits, and it was not enacted with the 
unmistakable intent to inflict punishment. 
Current Attainder Clause doctrine requires a court to engage in 
three separate inquiries to determine whether an act imposes 
punishment. First, the court looks to whether the act falls within the 
expanded historical meaning of legislative punishment. Second, the 
court examines the act’s legitimate nonpunitive purposes in light of 
the type and severity of the burdens it imposes. Here the court 
focuses on the state’s interest in regulating the institution as 
 92. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman 
shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two  persons  of the  same  sex  in  a 
civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or 
recognized in Nebraska.”); see also MarriageWatch.org, State Marriage Amendments, 
http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/Law/marriageamendments.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 2005) 
(providing the specific language used in current and pending marriage amendments). 
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described earlier in the Dent and Hawker cases. Finally, the court 
determines whether the legislature evinces an unmistakable, specific 
intent to punish the targeted class.93 The overarching consideration 
of the three inquiries is whether the targeted class is being deprived 
of any previously enjoyed right as a consequence of the past conduct. 
  
 a. Amendment Three does not fit the historical meaning of 
legislative punishment. Historically, the forms of punishment 
associated with bills of attainder included death, imprisonment, 
banishment, corruption of blood, or punitive confiscation of 
property.94 Clearly, Amendment Three does not impose any of the 
above-named punishments on any individual or class. In addition to 
the historical punishments associated with bills of attainder, 
prevailing Attainder Clause doctrine expands the meaning of 
punishment to include perpetual exclusion from an ordinary 
avocation of life on account of past conduct as a punishment.95
Deriving their argument from the ordinary avocation of life line 
of reasoning, proponents of same-sex marriage have argued that 
barring same-sex couples from receiving official marriage recognition 
constitutes a perpetual bar and is therefore punishment for bill of 
attainder purposes.96 However, Amendment Three differs from the 
perpetual exclusion cases (Cummings and Garland) in two essential 
aspects. First, Utah did not create the amendment to address past 
conduct; rather, it is in response to potential future events. Both 
Cummings and Garland involved laws imposing punishment for past 
conduct. Second, Amendment Three does not create a perpetual bar 
to those currently engaged in nontraditional unions. Whereas the 
two above-named cases both permanently disqualified individuals 
from certain occupations, Amendment Three does not disqualify 
anyone from obtaining the benefits of marriage in the future for 
having engaged in a nontraditional domestic unions in the past. Just 
 93. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 850; see also supra note 55 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473–74 (1965); see supra Part II.B. 
 95. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 852 (“In our own country, the list 
of punishments forbidden by the Bill of Attainder Clause has expanded to include legislative 
bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions.”). 
 96. Strasser, supra note 8, at 244–46 (implying that the Federal Defense of Marriage 
Act, which prohibits the extension of benefits to same-sex partners, constitutes punishment in 
the form of perpetual exclusion on account of past conduct). 
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as in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, the bar established is 
not absolute and is by no means perpetual because full benefits are 
obtainable through compliance with state constitutional 
requirements, notwithstanding past conduct.97
On the other hand, the counterargument asserts that the 
Attainder Clause would invalidate any enactment “that singles out 
persons for disfavored treatment based on their status.”98 Even 
assuming the correctness of this general view of the Attainder 
Clause, Amendment Three would not violate its principles because, 
as described above, the amendment does not single out same-sex 
relationships.99 Furthermore, the amendment does not disfavor 
anyone based on his or her status; it merely provides a particular 
social relationship with favored treatment by establishing general 
requirements that must be met before particular benefits may be 
obtained. While acts that provide persons with favored treatment 
may potentially raise constitutionality concerns under other clauses 
of the Constitution,100 the amendment simply reaffirms that 
monogamous, heterosexual unions are entitled to marriage benefits. 
Nowhere does the amendment invoke the status of any person or 
group. Simply put, the amendment does not single out homosexuals, 
lesbians, or bisexuals for disfavored treatment because of their sexual 
 97. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 850–52. 
 98. Amar, supra note 8, at 217. Professor Amar’s article is written in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), wherein the Court 
employed unclear reasoning (awkward language) in invalidating an amendment to the 
Colorado state constitution. The amendment prevented state agencies from treating sexual 
orientation as a protected status for discrimination purposes. The contours of professor Amar’s 
arguments are essentially as follows: The Constitution’s nonattainder principle, as he calls it, 
prevents all legislation that singles out persons for disfavored treatment based on their status. A 
person’s sexual orientation is a societal status and therefore any law that punishes or stigmatizes 
based on sexual orientation violates the nonattainder principle. See Amar, supra note 8, at 217–19.  
 99. Amar, supra note 8, at 219 (“Under the nonattainder principle, there is a right not 
to be singled out by name in a law” that disfavors persons based on their status as 
homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexuals.). Amendment Three does not name any nontraditional 
relationship or orientation, nor does it single out one particular group because its language 
broadly encompasses the entire range of nontraditional relationships. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 100. See Amar, supra note 8, at 213 (“A law naming persons and singling them out for 
distinctive treatment is suspicious. Not all such law are unconstitutional, however. For 
example, a law giving Akhil Reed Amar a special benefit would probably not violate the 
nonattainder principle, although at some point special privilege laws could raise questions 
under the Title of Nobility Clauses and more generally equal protection and republican 
government principles.”). 
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preferences and, therefore, does not impose punishment within the 
meaning of the first Attainder Clause punishment test. 
 
b. Amendment Three reasonably furthers legitimate nonpunitive 
purposes. Secondly, if it cannot be shown that a measure reasonably 
furthers legitimate nonpunitive goals, the enactment is considered 
punitive rather than regulatory in nature.101 The inclusion of this 
particular test for punishment has led some commentators to 
complain that the test is merely a variant of the equal protection 
doctrine and unnecessarily obscures constitutional lines.102 However, 
this test properly invites consideration of the state’s authority and 
power to regulate the regular avocations of life, thus ensuring that 
the Attainder Clause doctrine does not inappropriately inhibit the 
legislature from performing its proper rule-making function.103 
Therefore, this test requires first an assessment of whether favoring 
the traditional institution of marriage between a man and a woman is 
itself a legitimate, nonpunitive goal, and then an assessment of 
whether this goal is “reasonably furthered” by the enactment.104 
Once this is determined, it is possible to examine whether the means 
chosen to achieve this end are nonpunitive. 
Amendment Three and similar marriage amendments aim to 
achieve multiple goals, any one of which may be considered a 
legitimate, nonpunitive purpose. From the academic literature, the 
list of goals includes inter alia the following: expressing societal 
norms, benefiting children, encouraging heterosexuality, socializing 
adults, promoting human flourishing, promoting gender and class 
equality, bolstering liberal democracy, bolstering state support for 
the marriage institution, and preserving religious freedom.105 Because 
 101. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 853–54. 
 102. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 14, at 99. 
 103. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Through this prong of the punishment 
test, the entire contribution of the Dent and Hawker cases is preserved in current Attainder 
Clause doctrine. Without engaging in this critical inquiry, a court risks reverting back to a 
doctrinal approach that would invalidate a wide array of enactments, such as the acts 
considered in Dent and Hawker, which establish basic requirements for professional activities. 
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 104. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 853–54. 
 105. Dent, supra note 77, at 420–45 (providing detailed analysis of each goal); see also 
Charles J. Reid Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The Disappearing Cornerstone of the 
American Law of Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 449 (2004) (explaining other goals behind 
preserving traditional marriage). 
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it is beyond the scope of this Comment to enter into a detailed 
analysis of each of these goals,106 this Comment consolidates these 
specific goals, for analytical purposes, into the general goal of 
preserving and increasing confidence in heterosexual, monogamous 
marriage. Attainder Clause case law provides helpful examples in 
assessing whether favoring traditional marriage by preserving a 
particular set of benefits for marriages between a man and a woman 
is a legitimate, nonpunitive goal. 
In previous Supreme Court bill of attainder decisions, the 
legitimate nonpunitive goals that have withstood attainder challenges 
and appropriate mechanisms to reach these goals included: (1) 
preservation of confidence in the medical profession by establishing 
education requirements and preventing convicted felons from 
practicing medicine;107 (2) prevention of future economic harm 
posed by political strikes orchestrated by labor union leaders by 
establishing requirements designed to prevent certain individuals 
from serving in union leadership;108 (3) preservation of evidence for 
use at a single criminal trial by requiring production of confidential 
documents;109 (4) preservation of national monuments and records 
of historical value by preventing destruction of documents of 
historical significance;110 (5) encouraging compliance with the 
national draft requirement by conditioning federal benefits upon 
compliance with draft requirements;111 and (6) ensuring fairness in 
the allocation of scarce federal resources by restricting receipt of 
resources upon compliance with national draft requirements.112
The items listed above obviously differ substantially from each 
other and from the goal of preserving traditional marriage benefits 
 106. Certainly the legitimacy of each of these goals would be comprehensively developed 
during the litigation surrounding an Attainder Clause challenge. 
 107. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (upholding a statute barring 
convicted felons from practicing medicine); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) 
(upholding a provision establishing educational requirements for the practice of medicine in 
order to prevent nongraduates of medical schools from joining the profession). 
 108. Am. Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950) (upholding a 
statute that precluded members of the Communist Party from acting as officers of labor 
organizations). 
 109. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 477 (1977) (upholding an act that 
required former president Richard Nixon to release certain confidential documents). 
 110. Id. at 477–78. 
 111. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 854–56 
(1984). 
 112. Id. at 855–56. 
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for heterosexual monogamous unions. However, when one considers 
the existing and expanding body of scientific information 
demonstrating the benefits to children113 and society114 flowing from 
 113. See, e.g., ELEANOR MACCOBY, THE TWO SEXES, (1998) (summarizing the scientific 
literature about how mothers excel in providing children with emotional security and in 
reading the physical and emotional cues of infants, and how mothers provide unique counsel as 
their daughters confront physical, emotional, and social challenges associated with puberty and 
adolescence); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: 
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 38 (1994) (“If we were asked to design a system for making sure 
that children’s basic needs were met, we would probably come up with something quite similar 
to the two-parent ideal. Such a design, in theory, would not only ensure that children had 
access to the time and money of two adults, it also would provide a system of checks and 
balances that promoted quality parenting. The fact that both parents have a biological 
connection to the child would increase the likelihood that the parents would identify with the 
child and be willing to sacrifice for that child, and it would reduce the likelihood that either 
parent would abuse the child.”); DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER, (1996) 
(suggesting that a father’s pheromones influence the biological development of his daughters, 
that a strong monogamous heterosexual marriage provides role models for girls of what to 
look for in a man, and gives girls confidence to resist the sexual entreaties of their boyfriends); 
KYLE PRUETT, FATHERNEED 204 (2000) (demonstrating that children hunger for their 
biological parents); Bruce J. Ellis et al., Does Father Absence Place Daughters at Special Risk for 
Early Sexual Activity and Teenage Pregnancy?, 74 CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 801, 801–21 
(2003) (illustrating that girls who grow up apart from their biological father were much more 
likely to experience early puberty and teen pregnancy than girls who spent their entire 
childhood in an intact family). 
 114. In addition to the host of societal difficulties brought on by a decrease in child 
welfare as described in the sources in the previous note, the official recognition of 
nontraditional unions will likely lead to greater use of gender-neutral terms like “partners” 
combined with social and cultural pressure to neuter thinking and behavior as it relates to 
marriage. However, couples are less likely to divorce when the wife concentrates on 
childrearing and the husband concentrates on breadwinning. See E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & 
JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 31 (2002). 
Additionally, when the concept of marriage is disconnected from procreation, societies 
experience lower birthrates, which have been linked to increased social, political, and economic 
strains on society. Official recognition of nontraditional unions furthers the disconnect 
between marriage and procreation. The replacement fertility rate is 2.1 children per woman. 
“Countries which have legalized same-sex marriage experience some of the lowest birthrates in 
the world. For example, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada have birthrates that hover 
around 1.6 children per woman.” Richard G. Wilkins, Social Scientific Evidence Related to 
Same Sex Marriage, at 3 (on file with author). For national fertility rates, see CIA, The World 
Factbook: Sweden, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sw.html (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2005) and for more regarding the growing disconnect between marriage and 
procreation see The National Marriage Project, The State of Our Unions 2003, available at 
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/SOOU2003.pdf. See also, Patrick F. Fagan 
and Grace Smith, The Transatlantic Divide on Marriage: Dutch Data and the U.S. Debate on 
Same-Sex Unions, WebMemo #577, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/ 
wm577.cfm. (last visited Apr. 28, 2005) (demonstrating that since legal recognition of same-
sex marriage in the Netherlands in 1998, there has been a steady increase in the number of 
single-parent families, a steady decrease in the portion of the population that is married, and a 
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intact, traditional marriages, the stated goal is clearly a legitimate, 
nonpunitive interest. Furthermore, because knowledge about the 
potential future societal effects that may be associated with 
nontraditional unions is limited or unreliable,115 diluting public 
confidence in heterosexual monogamous relationships through 
modification of the existing system for dispensing marital benefits is 
unwise.  
When comparing the goals the Supreme Court has held to be 
legitimate, nonpunitive goals with the state’s interest in maintaining 
or increasing its support of heterosexual, monogamous marriage, the 
legitimacy of the latter stands out.116 The medical profession cares for 
life and limb—traditional marriage is the ideal place for the creation 
of life.117 If preserving confidence in the medical profession is a 
legitimate legislative goal, then it follows that preserving confidence 
in the institution of traditional marriage is likewise a legitimate goal. 
If preserving a limited number of evidentiary documents for a single 
trial was deemed a legitimate state interest,118 surely favoring the 
ideal place for raising children is at least an equally legitimate 
interest.119 Indeed, preserving and strengthening traditional marriage 
steady rise in the proportion of the population that is divorced). While the foregoing data do 
not definitively establish that official recognition of same-sex unions will lead directly to lower 
birthrates, these data do highlight a larger phenomenon growing out of a general decrease in 
the stability of the nuclear, traditional family. Adopting measures to strengthen the traditional 
family unit, therefore, would tend to combat the adverse consequences suggested above. 
 115. Wilkins, supra note 114, at 2 (explaining that although some research on the effect 
of same-sex couple parenting has asserted that there are no adverse effects on children, an 
independent review of the research indicates serious methodological and other problems with 
each study reviewed) (citing Steven Nock 2001, Affidavit to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice regarding Hedy Halpern et al.). 
 116. See supra notes 101–14 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 
114 (1889); supra note 114; see also Alvaré, supra note 7, at 18 n.47 (2004) (describing the 
central role the family in society and providing information on current birth rates, most of 
which still occur within traditional marriages).  
 118. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 477 (1977). 
 119. See supra note 113; see also, Dent, supra note 77, at 428–33, 434–35 (arguing that 
traditional marriage is instrumental in the socialization of current and future leaders of society 
and the inculcation of respect for civil authority and duty towards community among the 
citizenry); The Heritage Foundation, Family and Society Database, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/familydatabase/results.cfm?Key=463 (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2005) (providing the findings of various studies regarding children born out of 
wedlock). But see, Bernstein, supra note 7, at 211–12 (2003) (arguing that the detriments 
caused by state-sponsored marriage are greater than the benefits created by the institution, 
which should thus be abandoned). 
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appears at least as legitimate a goal as any of the other goals the 
Supreme Court has found to be legitimate, nonpunitive goals under 
an Attainder Clause analysis.120
Once the legitimacy of the goal is established, one must evaluate 
whether the means used to further the goal are nonpunitive.121 A 
measure for furthering a legitimate state interest is nonpunitive if it is 
designed to reach the calling or institution rather than the persons 
affected by the enactment.122
On this point, again, a great deal can be gleaned from past 
Supreme Court Attainder Clause decisions. From the legitimate 
goals and methods for furthering those goals listed above,123 several 
principles stand out. First, restricting entrance into a profession tends 
to preserve confidence in the institution.124 Second, prevention of 
 120. Of course, there are those who disagree that strengthening traditional marriage will 
benefit children and society. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 8, at 251–59 (arguing that 
preservation of traditional marriage in the way described is not a legitimate state interest). 
However, this is the case with virtually every hotly contested social or moral issue that 
confronts society. The polarity associated with this type of debate should not prevent open 
consideration of scientific research as well as history in resolving the issue. The Author believes 
it is possible for an extreme, unfettered passion for absolute equality of ideas, lifestyles, and 
actions to prove detrimental to society. For more on the dangers of extreme equality, see 
BARRON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. VIII, para. 2 (1751) (“The principle of 
democracy is corrupted not only when the spirit of equality is extinct, but likewise when [the 
people] fall into a spirit of extreme equality . . . .”), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2005). 
 121. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 850–52 
(1984). 
 122. Id. at 848 (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 271, 279 (1867)); see 
supra, note 40 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra notes 107–12 and accompanying text. 
 124. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 199 (1898) (holding that requirements 
that create a bar to entry are “intended to secure . . . that the community might trust with 
confidence those receiving a license under the authority of the state”). Obviously, receiving a 
license to practice medicine naturally requires more learning and capacity than obtaining a 
marriage license and the degree of trust associated with the recipients of a marriage license is 
not, and need not be, as high. But by requiring that applicants for a marriage license be of 
opposite sexes, the state ensures, at a minimum, the possibility that the union may produce 
offspring. The overriding principle being that the state may establish qualifications in the 
conferring of licenses in order to foster the interests of the state. But see Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961–62 (Mass. 2003) (holding in an equal protection analysis 
that the state’s interest in “providing a ‘favorable setting for procreation’” did not pass a 
rational basis test). Procreation certainly does occur outside the confines of traditional 
marriages and even some heterosexual couples are physically unable to bear children, but these 
facts do not diminish the interest the state has in promoting the ideal place for procreation to 
occur by favoring traditional marriages. Harking back to the medical profession analogy, the 
mere fact that a person has some ability to offer medical services to the public does not mean 
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future harm may be a legitimate goal.125 Third, benefits may be 
conditioned on compliance with basic requirements.126 Fourth, 
restriction of benefits in order to encourage behavior may be a 
permissible means to further a legitimate goal.127
Amendment Three operates well within these accepted 
boundaries. Initially, the amendment operates to exclude other 
nontraditional unions from entrance into the marriage arena, thereby 
preserving confidence in the institution. Next, while future societal 
drawbacks potentially caused by officially recognizing nontraditional 
unions are uncertain, the potential harms that may result from 
diluting confidence in the traditional heterosexual, monogamous 
marriage are more concrete.128 Amendment Three seeks to prevent 
these future societal harms by restricting entrance into the marriage 
arena. Moreover, the benefits associated with traditional marriage are 
conditioned on compliance with the basic requirement that a person 
enter this legal institution jointly with an adult person of the 
opposite sex. Finally, conditioning benefits on compliance with the 
“adult person of the opposite sex” requirement encourages and 
supports future heterosexual marriages. 
In effect, Amendment Three singles out traditional marriage for 
favored treatment.129 Singling out an institution for favored 
treatment tends to strengthen the institution—both philosophically 
and practically. On a philosophical level, the law plays a role in 
expressing “social values and in encouraging social norms to move in 
that that person’s services meet the ideal the state seeks to promote. Likewise, it matters little 
that alternative methods of procreation exist and occur; the state may still favor the ideal 
setting for procreation. 
 125. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950) (upholding a statute 
that precluded members of the Communist Party from acting as officers of labor organizations 
on the basis that the act sought to prevent future economic harm). 
 126. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 854–56 
(1984). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra notes 113–14 (citing sources upon which one can base the conclusion that 
at least some harm will result to children and society if traditional marriage is supplanted, even 
partially, by nontraditional unions). 
 129. It is important to recall that singling out an individual for favored treatment is far 
different than singling a person out for disfavored treatment. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983); see also supra Part II. By analogy, singling out traditional marriage for favored 
treatment should not raise constitutional bill of attainder concerns. 
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particular directions.”130 By integrating a long-standing and 
overwhelmingly accepted norm into the state’s governing document, 
a powerful message is conveyed and preserved for future generations. 
On a more practical level, by overtly favoring traditional marriage, 
government and society in general are more likely to move in that 
direction. This movement occurs by the adoption of further 
measures that strengthen traditional marriage and families.131 On 
each level, a legislature would be furthering the legitimate goal of 
preserving and increasing confidence in the traditional institution of 
marriage.  
The result of the preferential treatment provided to traditional 
marriage will likely be its strengthening as an institution. With the 
strengthening of traditional marriage, it is likely that the concomitant 
benefits will be preserved—thereby providing the legitimate, 
nonpunitive purpose for Amendment Three. 
 
c. Amendment Three lacks an unmistakable legislative intent to 
punish. The final test for determining whether an act is punishment 
for attainder purposes requires the review of the legislative history of 
the act to determine whether the legislature possessed motivation or 
intent to punish the targeted class.132 The evidence of legislative 
intent to punish must be “unmistakable” before a court may strike 
down an enactment.133 Several reasons support the conclusion that 
Amendment Three does not satisfy this motivational test for 
punishment. 
First, this test is geared toward evaluating congressional intent to 
punish and does not apply neatly, if at all, to enactments by the 
electorate. When reviewing a legislative act, the congressional record 
provides a fairly reliable source for determining the intent of the 
legislature. No such record exists for determining the intent of the 
electorate. It is virtually impossible to determine the 
“unmistakable”134 intent of the entire electorate. It is likely that there 
were many reasons for which voters voted for and against the 
amendment—some likely had no reason at all. The simple fact that 
 130. Dent, supra note 77, at 421 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social 
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 953 (1996)). 
 131. See Alvaré, supra note 7, at 31 (describing current initiative to strengthen marriage). 
 132. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984). 
 133. Id. at 856 n.15 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960)). 
 134. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. at 852. 
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the enactment under review is a state constitutional amendment 
rather than an ordinary statute makes a search for unmistakable 
intent very difficult and nearly impossible logistically. The only state 
constitutional amendment invalidated as a bill of attainder was the 
amendment considered in Cummings.135 However, at the time of the 
Cummings decision this test for finding punishment was not a part of 
the Attainder Clause analysis. Since there has been no Attainder 
Clause challenge to a state constitutional amendment wherein 
current Attainder Clause doctrine has been applied, it is difficult to 
predict just how a court would find unmistakable intent on the part 
of legislative body—the electorate—enacting the law. 
 A review of the debates surrounding the passage of the joint 
resolution to submit the amendment to the electorate for approval is 
the closest approximation to an examination of the legislative intent. 
A review of these debates shows that the members of the Utah 
House and Senate passed the resolution in order to preserve and 
strengthen the institution of marriage and ensure that the electorate 
was given an opportunity to decide the issue.136 None of the 
language in support of the resolution suggests any punitive motive, 
let alone an unmistakable punitive motive.137
 Additional reasons support the conclusion that in the passage of 
Amendment Three no unmistakable intent to punish a target class 
existed. One such reason is that Amendment Three served as a 
resolution to a hotly contested political debate. When this is the case, 
deferring to the voice of the people is wise.138 If this amendment had 
 135. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316–17 (1867) (invalidating an 
amendment to the Missouri state constitution that required attorneys and others to take an 
oath of loyalty wherein the individuals had to affirm that they had never aided the Confederacy 
during the Civil War). 
 136. H.J.R. 25, 2004 Gen. Leg. Sess. (Utah 2004) (containing the House and Senate 
floor debates over the resolution). In the debates the delegates in favor of the bill repeatedly 
expressed a feeling of toleration and concern for the welfare homosexuals in the state. Id. The 
prevailing motivation among the delegates seemed to be a desire to ensure that the electorate, 
not the judiciary, had the opportunity to decide what policy should govern the institution of 
marriage. See id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Worthen, supra note 24, at 306. (arguing that the best forum for hotly-contested 
political issues to be resolved by state constitutional amendment). But see generally Jack M. 
Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2004) 
(discussing the interplay between majority opinion and Supreme Court decisions in the 
development of societal opinions on social and moral issues); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order 
Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005) (discussing the tyranny of the majority and the 
treatment of electoral minorities in a majoritrian system). 
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been a secondary response to a previously resolved political 
controversy, like the circumstances surrounding the amendment in 
Cummings,139 perhaps the intent of the electorate would be easier to 
determine. But, because Amendment Three represents the people’s 
first opportunity to express their views on the controversy, punitive 
intent is very difficult to clearly discern, especially so as to be 
unmistakable. 
Indeed, the amendment process was created specifically to allow 
the people to resolve hotly contested moral issues by allowing the 
electorate to establish general policies to govern society rather than 
leaving these questions in the hands of the government. 
[I]n our system, the ultimate sovereign who must remain 
responsible for whatever acts the government takes is the people. 
While there are filters through which the people’s judgment must 
pass before it is properly implemented in our system, in the long 
run, it is their judgment, not that of the judiciary, which should 
control.140
Amendment Three’s history does not reveal an unmistakable 
intent on the part of the electorate to punish anyone. Rather, it 
reveals that the amendment process accomplished its intended 
purpose. Specifically, Amendment Three’s history demonstrates that 
the amendment process facilitated the resolution of an important 
social question by the electorate. 
Considering the foregoing analysis of Amendment Three 
according to current Attainder Clause doctrine, the following 
conclusions result: First, Amendment Three does not reach the level 
of specificity required to implicate Attainder Clause concerns because 
of its broad, general language and its general applicability to all 
nontraditional domestic unions. Second, Amendment Three does 
not punish any person or group in any of the historical forms of 
punishment; it merely singles out an important societal institution 
for favored treatment. Third, the purpose of strengthening 
traditional marriage in order to increase the benefits to children and 
society is a legitimate state interest that is reasonably furthered by the 
 139. The amendment in Cummings was enacted just after the resolution of the Civil War 
and was designed to inflict punishment on the already defeated Confederate sympathizers. 
Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 316–17.  
 140. Worthen, supra note 24, at 306 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
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amendment. And finally, the amendment was not enacted with an 
unmistakable punitive intent. Based upon these conclusions, 
Amendment Three does not fall within the Supreme Court’s current 
doctrinal conception of what constitutes a bill of attainder. 
C. Consideration of Doctrinal Implications 
Deciding whether Amendment Three and other marriage 
amendments are bills of attainder will likely have important doctrinal 
implications in the constitutional system. In arriving at a decision in 
an Attainder Clause challenge to a marriage amendment, a court 
must be sensitive to the doctrinal implications of its decision.141 
Specifically, a court must be sensitive to the effect its Attainder 
Clause construction will have on the separation of powers and the 
political process. A construction of the Attainder Clause that is too 
broad has the potential to severely hamper the legislature’s ability to 
establish generally applicable rules142 and may potentially cripple the 
political process.143 The purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is not 
to prevent the legislature or electorate from resolving a political 
debate—it is to prevent postresolution punishment of political 
opponents.144 Keeping this general purpose in mind while deciding 
Attainder Clause cases will guide a court in balancing the important 
constitutional interests impacted by its decision. 
The resolution of a political controversy to the dissatisfaction of 
one side is not punishment for attainder analysis purposes145 and 
should not raise Attainder Clause concerns. If this were the case, 
legislatures could not resolve the majority of political controversies 
by subsequent legislation without punishing the opponents of the 
measure and raising bill of attainder concerns. No matter the issue, 
the class or group that finds itself on the losing side of the political 
debate will suffer either an actual disability or a curtailment of its 
ability to obtain a desired outcome or benefit. This cannot and for 
 141. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 327–30 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Court can minimize or avoid future constitutional conflicts by 
careful construction of constitutional provisions and citing supporting cases). 
 142. See supra note 22. 
 143. See supra note 24.  
 144. Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 498 (arguing that the Attainder Claus was intended 
as a substantive protection for groups and individuals that engage in political activities and 
should not be construed so as to have no rational limitation). 
 145. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 470 (1977). 
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doctrinal purposes should not be construed as punishment. The 
Nixon Court explained: “By arguing that an individual or defined 
group is attainted whenever he or it is compelled to bear burdens 
which the individual or group dislikes, . . . the anchor that ties the 
bill of attainder clause to realistic conceptions of classification and 
punishment [is removed].”146 If a court considers a dissatisfied 
political group as having been singled out and punished (i.e. 
attainted) by legislation unfavorable to their cause, the very 
legislative process will be crippled.147 The legislature would 
potentially confront an Attainder Clause challenge to virtually every 
law that a political minority opposes. Therefore, Congress and the 
legislatures of every state would be limited “to the choice of 
legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not 
legislating at all.”148
The holdings in Cummings and Garland further illustrate this 
important point. In Cummings, after the Civil War had ended, 
Missouri singled out the Confederate sympathizers and barred them 
from holding positions of trust that prior to the war they were free 
to hold.149 Likewise in Ex parte Garland, the Congress barred 
Confederate attorneys who had been admitted to the bar prior to the 
war from practicing law in federal courts as a consequence of their 
allegiance to the Confederacy during the war.150 In both cases the 
Court found that the acts were unlawful bills of attainder because 
they singled out political opponents and prescribed punishments as a 
direct consequence of having taken an opposing political position.151 
These examples highlight the fact that the initial resolution of a 
political controversy does not constitute punishment; rather, it is the 
left jab after the round is over that raises bill of attainder concern. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. For an illustration of this crippling effect, see Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc., v. 
Bruning, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008–11 (D. Neb. 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs had 
stated a claim that the state amendment was an unlawful bill of attainder, thus defeating the 
defense’s motion to dismiss). In this case, the court held that an entity advocating for gay 
rights had been punished because the amendment made it more difficult for the entity to 
obtain a desired political outcome in Nebraska. Id. The court’s reasoning, if adopted widely, 
would make an attainder challenge available for every disgruntled political group in the country 
and the legislative process would be severely impeded. 
 148. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471. 
 149. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316–17 (1867). 
 150. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 374–75 (1867). 
 151. See id. at 388–99; Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323–25. 
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The practical result of Amendment Three is that it resolves the 
political issue of same-sex marriage in Utah and as such cannot be 
said to be punishment, notwithstanding the fact that some may 
“dislike” the effect of the law.152 Suppose, however, that the Utah 
legislature enacts further legislation that makes any lawyer who 
worked to defeat Amendment Three or who voted against 
Amendment Three ineligible to renew his or her license to practice 
law in the state. This exclusion would constitute punishment as a 
consequence of past political activity and would violate the Attainder 
Clause.153 
In summary, the decision whether marriage amendments are bills 
of attainder not only implicates important social and moral policies 
but also raises important concerns regarding the construction of the 
Attainder Clause. These concerns about preserving the legislative and 
political processes may be adequately addressed by keeping in mind 
that the purpose of the Attainder Clause is to prevent the victorious 
party from punishing political opponents after having won the 
political battle. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the general view 
that the Bill of Attainder Clause is an important, presently functional 
constitutional provision designed to protect individuals and groups 
from being singled out for legislative punishment. Current Supreme 
Court doctrine under the Attainder Clause requires consideration of 
the enactment’s specificity and the existence of punishment. Whether 
an act inflicts punishment is determined by engaging in a three-
pronged analysis that brings into consideration a multitude of 
factors. Considering Amendment Three in light of these factors leads 
to the conclusion that it is not a bill of attainder because it lacks the 
requisite specificity and does not inflict punishment under any prong 
of the test. 
Furthermore, Amendment Three represents the electorate’s 
decision on what general policy will apply with regard to the 
meaning of marriage in contemporary society. Simply resolving a 
political controversy and establishing a generally applicable policy 
 152. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 470. 
 153. See Beyond Process, supra note 14, at 498–502. 
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cannot, under a thorough attainder analysis, and should not, for 
doctrinal reasons, be consider a bill of attainder. 
Daniel H. Walker 
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